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INTRODUCTION 
Negative externalities are costs imposed on third parties. The para-
digmatic example is pollution. A firm manufactures a product that gener-
ates toxic waste, and dumps the waste; society pays for the associated 
cost, including, for instance, the community’s health problems caused by 
the waste. Profit is supposed to measure the firm’s revenues in excess of 
the associated costs; because this cost is not included, the firm’s profits 
are higher than they should be, and there is more pollution than there 
should be. What is privately optimal diverges from what is socially opti-
mal.1 
The concept of negative externalities is intuitively appealing. It is 
firmly entrenched in economic analysis even though it is almost impossi-
ble to apply with any rigor in many important real-world contexts. What 
is the baseline from which “pollution” is measured? How clean must the 
air and water surrounding the firm be? And whose costs must the firm 
take into account in order to internalize the externalities? Clearly, the 
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518 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:517 
firm’s next door neighbors harmed by the polluted air generated by the 
firm. But what about people who are more remotely affected?   
The answer to these questions cannot be determined mechanically. 
There is no neutral way to set the baseline below which deviations count 
as costs (and above which positive deviations count as benefits), nor is 
there a neutral way of determining whose costs count. Indeed, the base-
line that separates negative and positive externalities and, more broadly, 
taking only one’s own versus others’ interests into account, is not only 
indeterminate, it is also dynamic, affected by actions and reactions. The 
rhetoric of negative externalities has the pernicious effect of reinforcing a 
view to the contrary: that a firm should, and should be required by law 
to, avoid imposing what can uncontroversially be characterized as nega-
tive externalities, but that it need not otherwise take others’ interests into 
account. An uncritical acceptance of the concept of negative externalities 
has led people on seemingly opposing sides of a hot debate in corporate 
law to miss large areas of existing convergence and fail to capitalize on 
possibilities for more convergence. The convergence concerns what so-
ciety wants firms to do. Society does not, of course, speak with one 
voice. However, some areas may be commanding increasing consensus. 
This consensus is of course not always easy to discern. Moreover, 
in the short term, the convergence may lead to pursuit of “causes du 
jour” rather than more principled assessments of what society might, and 
arguably should, want. Finally, there will always be areas where societal 
interests and profit-seeking conflict. But the difference between pure 
profit-maximizing firms and socially responsible firms may be far more 
evident in theory than in practice. This last point goes beyond externali-
ties, addressing firms’ conduct with those with whom they directly deal, 
including their employees and their customers. Consider the recent ex-
ample of Martin Shkreli, who 
was vilified on social media and became the symbol for price goug-
ing after his company, Turing Pharmaceuticals, raised the price of a 
62-year-old drug it had acquired to $750 a pill from $13.50. 
While not the first huge overnight price increase for a drug, this 
one touched a public nerve and intensified . . . . 
After fiercely defending the price increase in various interviews 
and on Twitter for two days, Mr. Shkreli backed down a bit late 
Tuesday. He told television news networks that the price of the 
drug, Daraprim, would be lowered, though he did not specify what 
the new price would be. 
“I think that it makes sense to lower the price in response to the 
anger that was felt by people,” 
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said Mr. Shkreli.2 
In late November, Turing announced that it would not lower the 
price after all, “[b]ut . . . said it would offer discounts of up to 50 percent 
to hospitals and would take other measures to help patients afford the 
medicine.”3 It is hard to appraise how meaningful this relief will be, or 
how much the negative reaction to the price increase will affect what 
drug companies using this business model do going forward. Even after 
the extremely negative publicity Shkreli got from the dramatic price in-
crease, another company he and other investors acquired, KaloBios 
Pharmaceuticals, announced that it would dramatically raise the price of 
a drug for another serious disease.4  But there are two Congressional 
probes of the business practice at issue.5   
Certainly, there will continue to be market, regulatory, and popular 
pressure for a solution. One company, Imprimis, using what is arguably a 
loophole, has announced that it will produce and sell for $1 a drug iden-
tical to the drug on which Turing was raising the price, and has pledged 
to manufacture and sell other “sole source legacy” drugs cheaply. 6 
Shkreli had contributed to Bernie Sanders’ presidential campaign; Sand-
ers gave Shkreli’s money to an AIDS charity (because the medication on 
which Turing raised the price was especially important for AIDS pa-
tients).7 Hillary Clinton has spoken out against Shkreli as well, as has 
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Donald Trump.8 Clinton has vowed to address the problem legislatively 
should she become President.9 Finally, Shkreli himself has been arrested 
for securities fraud, for using funds of a company he controlled to pay off 
investors who lost money in another company he controlled.10 Certainly, 
the publicity accompanying the arrest, if not also perhaps the push to in-
vestigate and charge Mr. Shkreli, reflect the disgust his business practic-
es have elicited. A Google search for “Shkreli most hated man in Ameri-
ca” done on December 17, 2015, yields 1,250,000 hits. Some articles 
reporting the story of Mr Shkreli’s arrest were titled: Shkreli, CEO Re-
viled for Drug Price Gouging, Arrested on Securities Fraud Charges.11 
Shkreli has now resigned as CEO of Turing,12 and been terminated as 
CEO of KaloBios, also resigning from the KaloBios board.13 
Is Turing’s business model—of pricing drugs so as to get the most 
money possible from customers who desperately need them and seem to 
have no ready alternative supplier—profit-maximizing? Maybe not. 
Maybe those otherwise inclined to pursue such a strategy will be dis-
suaded by the saga of (and responses to) Mr. Shkreli. Indeed, at this junc-
ture, it is hard to know whether the business model will be viable. Dif-
ferent firms will have different views on what they should do. These 
views will be strongly influenced by firms’ beliefs about what law, repu-
tation, and their relationships with regulators require. But the reaction to 
Shkreli may augur in an era where societal pressure, and regulators who 
are responsive to this pressure, erode the model’s viability, perhaps ulti-
mately eliminating it.14 
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 14. See Gretchen Morgenson, Valeant’s High-Price Drug Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/business/valeants-high-price-drug-strategy.html.  
Morgenson describes the history of the relationship between drug companies and investors: 
 Until recently, investors were positively star-struck by drug companies that could 
raise prices indiscriminately, letting their patients struggle to pay the freight. Lauded for a 
laserlike focus on shareholder returns, companies like Valeant Pharmaceuticals Interna-
tional . . . received high marks and even higher valuations from besotted shareholders. 
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This picture suggests a complex role for law. A starting point might 
be that law should get firms to internalize externalities15—even commen-
tators who are quite skeptical of law consider this function of law to be 
legitimate. But if internalizing externalities cannot feasibly be operation-
alized in many important contexts, what role can and should law play? 
Law’s instrumental force is important, but so is its expressive force. 
Conversations about what law should forbid and encourage are part of a 
broader societal dialogue that can lead to consensus and convergence.16 
I. THE INCOHERENCE AND UNINTELLIGIBILITY OF NEGATIVE 
EXTERNALITIES 
The 2008 financial crisis, from which we are still recovering, 
caused considerable pain to many people and to society at large. The his-
tory of the crisis is still being written and its causes are still being debat-
ed. But the securitization of an enormous volume of subprime mortgages 
is clearly a significant cause. Mortgages, many based on fraudulent doc-
umentation, were made to borrowers who could not repay, to buy houses 
with inflated valuations; these mortgages were sold and packaged into 
securities that were sold to investors, including many institutional inves-
tors investing for others, as safe, high-quality investments.17 Critically 
                                                                                                                                        
 Now, however, investors are beginning to see the peril in such a business model. 
Sure, price jumps may generate earnings and stock gains, but when the enrichment of a 
few comes at the cost of many, unwanted scrutiny often follows. 
Id. The article continues with the story of the Shkreli controversy: 
The spotlight soon fell on Valeant, which generated $8.25 billion in revenue last year, up 
43 percent from 2013. Among its well-known drugs is Ativan, a treatment for anxiety. 
 Valeant caught the eye of Congress this year after it increased the price of two heart 
medications it had just bought the rights to sell: Nitropress and Isuprel. Valeant raised the 
price of Nitropress 212 percent and Isuprel 525 percent. 
 Democratic members of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Re-
form, led by Elijah Cummings, the Maryland Democrat who is its ranking member, have 
been investigating rocketing drug prices. This year they asked Valeant to provide docu-
ments about the increases; it declined. 
 So last Monday, 18 Democratic members of the committee asked its chairman to 
subpoena Valeant for those documents. 
 It is unclear whether the subpoena will be issued. But Valeant’s stock slid 16.5 per-
cent on the news. It recovered somewhat later in the week, but it has lost more than 30 
percent since its August high closing price of $262.52. 
Id. 
 15 . See PARISI, supra note 1; see also AVERY WIENER KATZ, FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 42 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2006) (1998). Imposing negative 
externalities is a market failure; an accepted use of law is to remedy market failures. 
 16. This is, of course, not to say that law should not forbid or encourage behavior for other 
reasons; this Article takes no broad position on what law should, or should not, do. 
 17 . See CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS: 
PROMOTING GOOD BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 22–40 (2015). 
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for purposes of this Article, many of the people hurt were not parties to 
either the mortgage transactions or the securitization transactions. 
Standard economic theory argues that firms should be made to in-
ternalize the costs—negative externalities—they impose on others.18 The 
“should” is normative: firms will be able to profit at society’s expense if 
they can foist costs of their business on others. Whatever else law should 
do, it should force firms to internalize negative externalities. 
Let us return to the well-worn and supposedly simple example of 
pollution. A firm that pollutes is imposing costs on others; law should 
determine the appropriate fine and probability of detection that aligns the 
firm’s interests with those of society. But how would we go about trying 
to get the appropriate firms to internalize the negative externalities at 
issue in the financial crisis? Trying to articulate a principled basis for 
characterizing some of the costs as negative externalities suggests how 
difficult—I would say impossible—the task ultimately is. 
Consider this article written in 2013 by Sheila Bair, former chair-
person of the FDIC, including during the years that the financial crisis 
was most acute: 
I told myself I wasn’t going to do a “Lehman” column given 
the media frenzy over this month’s five-year anniversary of that in-
stitution’s bankruptcy. But in researching a new book I am writing 
for young adults about the 2008 financial crisis, I have been uncom-
fortably reminded of the hardship so many families encountered be-
cause of the crisis, particularly their kids. 
Their plight has been largely forgotten in the power politics that 
have overcome financial reform. It’s all about winners and losers, 
with regulators and reform advocates pitted against a powerful in-
dustry lobbying machine, oiled by political money and the grease of 
revolving door jobs. The objective of protecting the public from an-
other recession brought on by an unstable financial sector seems 
lost in the Washington shuffle. 
So let me recount the heartbreaking memories of the families I 
have interviewed. They bear tragic similarities. Their problems usu-
ally started with a steeply resetting mortgage payment, or job loss or 
cutback, frequently combined with an unexpected health problem 
not covered by insurance. Whatever the catalyst, it is almost always 
followed by high levels of stress for the family, sleepless nights for 
parents and kids, deteriorating grades at school, lost hope as savings 
are depleted, and finally the loss of a home. The kids give up their 
                                                             
 18. See PARISI, supra note 1; KATZ, supra note 15. 
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rooms, their pets, their schools, their neighborhoods, and will al-
ways live with the traumatic memories of their forced dislocation.19 
Whose costs should be included within an assessment of the nega-
tive externalities of the financial crisis? This Article makes a case for the 
children of parents whose homes were foreclosed upon. Many others 
have been identified and discussed in the press and in scholarship on the 
crisis: neighbors in neighborhoods with many foreclosed homes and 
people providing services in those neighborhoods; municipalities that 
counted on tax revenues and instead got lower revenues and perhaps in-
creased crime; any investor in the stock market who suffered from the 
wild volatility and, especially, those who may have needed money before 
the market recovered, and so on.20 
Bair continues: 
To be sure, many of the parents I have interviewed bear some 
responsibility for their troubles. As home prices escalated, they re-
peatedly refinanced their houses to pull out cash. When the housing 
market turned, they were left with unaffordable mortgage debt, 
which far exceeded the value of their homes. But these cash-out 
refis were not always done to pay for fancy vacations or flat screen 
TVs as apologists for Wall Street would have you believe. Rather, 
more typically, the money was used to pay for college tuition, med-
ical bills, or simply to help make ends meet.21 
Note that the externalities are characterized as being imposed by the 
lenders even though the borrowers voluntarily took out the loans. Why is 
this? In the period leading up to the crisis, banks were known to make 
borrowers believe they could always refinance their houses and repay in 
that manner; sometimes, banks lied about borrowers’ assets and income 
to make them qualify for loans.22 Thus, even where “parental responsibil-
ity” is part of the overall story, bank behavior can be seen as imposing 
negative externalities given the banks’ responsibility for the loans. But 
imagine such “responsibility” where banks were lending money at the 
borrower’s behest, with full disclosure and no deception, perhaps even 
actively attempting to discourage the loans from being taken out. The 
costs to the children would be just as great. But characterizing the costs 
to the children as a result of negative externalities imposed by the banks 
would no longer seem apt (except for those with highly paternalistic 
                                                             
 19. Sheila Bair, Remembering the Families at the Center of the Financial Crisis, FORTUNE 
(Sept. 13, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2013/09/13/remembering-the-families-at-the-center-
of-the-financial-crisis/. 
 20. See generally HILL & PAINTER, supra note 17. 
 21. Bair, supra note 19. 
 22. See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 17. 
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views as to companies’ roles in protecting people against themselves.) 
Pressure—even law—might be brought to bear on the banks in those 
cases, to add even more disclosure or tests that the disclosure had been 
understood, or even to not make the loans at all, although banks would in 
this case be helping to remedy a societal problem, not “internalizing an 
externality.” 
Complicating the analysis, the assumed baseline for these borrow-
ers is that they would not have gotten a loan but for these lenders. But 
determined borrowers can very often get loans, and the other loans avail-
able to these borrowers might very well have had far worse terms than 
the loans they actually took out. Had the parents taken out those other 
loans instead of the loans they did take out, their children might have 
been worse off. In sum, we want banks to do certain things and not do 
other things; getting banks to “internalize negative externalities” is at 
best a first step, and, I would argue, more of a rhetorical step than a real 
guide to policy. 
Even the paradigmatic and seemingly easy case of pollution is far 
harder than it seems. Where there is a discrete event, such as an oil spill, 
we can envision a baseline from which to measure negative deviations: 
the pre-spill state. And we can often say, at least in retrospect and proba-
bly even in prospect, that companies did not spend enough, certainly in 
retrospect and arguably even in prospect, on even a conservative assess-
ment, to prevent or minimize the harm they caused23—that they should 
be incentivized to better “internalize the externality.” But we are hard 
pressed to quantify the harm within a very broad range.24 And again, 
which parties’ injuries count?25 The range of estimates for the 2010 BP 
                                                             
 23. See, e.g., John M. Broder, BP Shortcuts Led to Gulf Oil Spill, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/science/earth/15spill.html. 
 24. See the articles on BP Oil Spill Cost, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
news/bp-oil-spill-cost/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2015); note how the estimates of costs keep changing 
(increasing). 
 25. Consider this account of effects of the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 
 For one young family living in Long Beach, Miss., the Macondo well blowout and 
BP oil spill that began April 20, 2010 is more than a footnote in our nation’s tragic envi-
ronmental history. 
 For Christina Tillman and husband Derek, now raising three boys just a few miles 
from where they lived in coastal Pass Christian, everyday life means continual trips to the 
doctor and worries about their children’s and their own long-term health. 
 While no one in the family worked on the Vessels of Opportunity, like many resi-
dents there, the toxic effects following the Macondo well blowout were horrific. 
 At the time, the couple’s only son, Gaven, was 2. Prior to the BP oil spill, his mom 
says he was a very healthy little boy. But afterwards, she says, “We went to the beach 
every now and then, [and later] chemicals found in his body showed a lot of the symp-
toms and signs [of the toxicity of the spill.]” 
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oil spill were within an extremely broad range; what was eventually paid 
was at the high end of the range, in billions, even putting aside the cost to 
BP’s reputation.26 Indeed, the actual cost a company ends up paying is 
far from a perfect measure of what it should have taken into account ex 
ante. Many factors not related to the damage it imposes can affect the 
computation of costs considerably, such as political pressure, negative 
publicity, and the recruitment efforts of plaintiffs’ lawyers. Furthermore, 
under pressure from regulators or voluntarily, a company might return 
the area to a better condition than it was in before the pollution. 
For pollution that does not occur in a discrete event, the range of 
possible damage may be lower, but the issue of assessing whose costs 
count remains. People whose health is better on account of diminished 
pollution are clearly in the category; what about less salient actors, such 
as farmers who save money because their animals can be given the water 
from the local stream rather than purified water they had to be given 
when the stream was polluted, and even the animals themselves? And 
there might be costs to some and benefits to others. The purified water 
plant required because of pollution could produce many positive exter-
nalities itself—employment, water that is more pure than the nonpolluted 
stream’s water would otherwise have been, and so on. 
Where does this leave us? Internalizing negative externalities is an 
appealing concept, but it is not clear how to operationalize it: what, con-
cretely, should corporations do to internalize negative externalities and 
what should law do to require them to do so? Indeed, law has a more 
complicated role in influencing corporate behavior, as I will argue below. 
It is part of a broader set of pressures and influences, some legal and 
some reputational. 
                                                                                                                                        
 Indeed. [sic] She shared the boy’s bloodwork results with this examiner, which 
show that on Dec. 15, 2010, Ethylbenzene in the amount of 0.1” to 0.3” ppb was detect-
ed, placing him in the 95th percentile for volatile solvents. 
 It cost the couple about $450 for this test, one of a flurry of bills they’d incur over 
the years as they struggled to handle not only the physical but the financial and emotional 
tolls of post-spill life. 
 Christina says they left Pass Christian because it was evident that it was toxic to live 
there. 
 . . . . 
 And the dangers didn’t just issue from the petroleum products, but from the copious 
amounts of Corexit [dispersant used as part of the clean-up effort] being air dropped 
along the Gulf. 
Laurie Wiegler, BP Oil Spill 5 Years Later: A Young Family Struggles with Oil, Corexit Effects, 
EXAMINER.COM (Apr. 19, 2015, 6:33 PM), http://www.examiner.com/article/bp-oil-spill-5-years-
later-a-young-family-struggles-with-oil-corexit-effects. The article continues with a listing of the 
many symptoms reported by each member of the family. Notably, besides the huge monetary dam-
age, BP was vilified in the press. 
 26. See sources cited supra note 24. 
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Commentators have distinguished between firms that are pure prof-
it-maximizers, pursuing their own interests (profits) without taking into 
account others’ interests, and firms that are “socially responsible” and 
take others’ interests into account.27 My argument suggests that given the 
complex role and interaction of law and other pressures, profit maximi-
zation is a far less different endeavor from being “socially responsible” 
than might be supposed. 
II. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION VERSUS CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In popular parlance, and in much academic literature,               prof-
it-maximizing firms are contrasted with socially responsible firms.28 To 
caricature, the former care (only) about “themselves” (profits), while the 
latter also care about “others” (interests beyond shareholder value). The-
se two stylized types of corporations can be viewed as extreme points 
along a continuum, where one end is “concern for self” and the other is 
“concern for others.” Of course, by contrast with profit maximization, 
what concern for others means, and how it would be evidenced, is not a 
matter of general consensus. That profit maximization is relatively 
straightforward has well-known felicitous features, including that its pur-
suit would be expected to be favored by all shareholders, whereas differ-
ent shareholders might have different views as to other corporate aims.29 
Profit maximization is also associated with more rigor: with an 
agreed-upon goal, energy can and will be focused on achieving that goal 
in the most cost-effective way possible. 
A debate exists as to whether corporations “should” operate exclu-
sively or primarily for the purpose of maximizing profit, or whether they 
“should” also be “socially responsible” as that term has come to be un-
derstood. Part of the debate is a matter of first principles, not amenable to 
resolution: do firms have obligations to the greater society (beyond those 
law or their self-interest require)? One can argue that society grants to 
firms privileges such as limited liability for their owners, which incentiv-
izes externalization of risks; therefore, firms should as a matter of mo-
rality and also as a matter of countering the perverse externalization in-
                                                             
 27. Many commentators have weighed in on this debate. For views from various different 
perspectives, see the posted articles and the links at the blog of a leading corporate law professor, 
Stephen Bainbridge at Corporate Social Responsibility, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM, 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/corporate-social-responsibility/ (last 
updated Dec. 16, 2015). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. 
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centive take others’ interests more readily into account.30 Thus, besides 
arguments from first principles, there are also arguments as to what 
makes more sense all things considered. 
The pure profit-maximizing firms will take into account others’ in-
terests consistent with their profit-maximizing mission. They will re-
spond appropriately to legal incentives, which ideally should make them 
act as though the baseline incorporated in the law were their own base-
line. But they have other incentives to take the interests of other stake-
holders into account. One such incentive is their concern for their reputa-
tion. Perhaps taking such interests into account helps with their reputa-
tion, or perhaps not doing so hurts their reputation if their competitors 
are taking such interests into account. What helps or hurts reputation is, 
in significant part, both contingent and dynamic, as the contrast between 
bank and banker bravado precrisis with bank and banker circumspection 
postcrisis evidences. Moreover, firms will have an incentive to preempt 
potentially problematic regulation, and also dispose regulators favorably 
to them; taking others’ interests into account may help in those regards as 
well. All these reasons for taking others’ interests into account are in-
strumental for a corporation’s own benefit—that is, profit; they are not 
motivated by a view that others’ interests should be taken into account. 
Socially responsible firms, too, may be being instrumental—they may 
want to brand themselves as socially responsible to get business. Indeed, 
interestingly, when firms make efforts to take others’ interests into ac-
count, they increasingly are publicizing their rigor in doing so—the se-
lection principles they used, and the results they achieved.31 
III. BEYOND EXTERNALITIES: THE SOCIETAL CONVERGENCE 
I have argued that notwithstanding its important use in standard 
economic theory, and its common sense appeal, the concept of externali-
ties promises more than it can deliver. This matters because in the con-
text of an important debate, between those who think firms should exclu-
                                                             
 30. The types of “others” whose interests socially responsible firms generally consider are, 
however, not generally the people they injure because their owners have limited liability. 
 31. See, e.g., Citizenship & Sustainability, AT&T, http://about.att.com/csr (last visited Nov. 4, 
2015); CSR at BNY Mellon: Progress Toward CSR Goals, BNY MELLON, 
https://www.bnymellon.com/us/en/who-we-are/social-responsibility/csr-at-bny-mellon.jsp#ir/ 
progress-toward-csr-goals- (last visited Nov. 4, 2015); see also SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.sasb.org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2015). The webpage of the Sustaina-
bility Accounting Standards Board is deliberately modeled after the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board. Here is the SASB’s mission statement: “The mission of the SASB is to develop and dissemi-
nate sustainability accounting standards that help public corporations disclose material, decision-
useful information to investors. That mission is accomplished through a rigorous process that in-
cludes evidence-based research and broad, balanced stakeholder participation.” See id. (follow 
“About SASB” hyperlink; then follow “Vision and Mission” hyperlink). 
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sively or principally profit maximize and those who think firms should 
(also) behave “responsibly” to other constituencies, the concept of exter-
nalities has obscured the extent of convergence between the two sides. 
Both types of firms are guided not only by law but also by reputation. A 
profit-maximizing firm might conclude that it would do better by living 
up to some societal consensus as to what a firm should and should not 
do. Perhaps it would do better than its competitors if it did so, or it would 
do worse if it did not do so, and perhaps regulators might be more favor-
ably inclined toward it or unfavorable regulation might be preempted. 
The motive for these socially responsible actions would not be to help 
others for its own sake, but rather, to help itself. But so what? Attributing 
a motive to a firm is difficult given how many people are involved in the 
firm’s decisions. Society should presumably be almost as pleased by 
self-serving socially responsible conduct as by socially responsible con-
duct motivated by a concern for others. What counts as socially respon-
sible conduct? Even firms motivated by a concern for others (to the ex-
tent this construction is intelligible) want the conduct to get them reputa-
tional benefits, and firms who are principally profit-maximizers are in it 
for the benefit.32 That reputational benefits are available suggests that the 
behavior at issue is subject to a societal consensus as to its desirability. 
The societal consensus seems to be what is really at issue. 
Recall the example of the Turing Pharmaceutical Company dis-
cussed earlier in this essay. Perhaps Turing acted illegally; it is being 
investigated for, among other things, antitrust violations, with the New 
York attorney general arguing that it may have tried to restrict competi-
tion in the drug in order to be able to raise the prices so dramatically.33 
Perhaps laws will be changed to make raising drug prices under certain 
circumstances illegal. Or perhaps the expensive and time-consuming 
FDA approval process for generic drugs, which caused other companies 
not to be interested in manufacturing or marketing the drug, will be 
changed.34 As discussed above, a pharmaceutical “compounding” com-
pany that is allowed to manufacture small “custom” quantities of drugs 
without needing FDA approval, Imprimis, has announced plans to sell at 
a very low cost a drug very similar to the drug whose price was raised so 
                                                             
 32. Google searches such as “corporate social responsibility reputation” and “corporate social 
responsibility” elicit many articles discussing reputational benefits of corporate social responsibility. 
Academic literature elicited with the search term “motivations for corporate social responsibility” 
also generally addresses the benefits to a corporate brand from having a reputation as being socially 
responsible. 
 33. See Pollack & Creswell, supra note 2. 
 34. Sarah Kliff, A Generic Pill’s Price Just Went Up $700. Why Doesn’t Another Company 
Create a Competitor?, VOX, http://www.vox.com/2015/9/22/9373557/daraprim-competitor-turing 
(last updated Sept. 22, 2015). 
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dramatically by Turing;35 insofar as very few people had the condition 
for which the drug was needed, the specific problem of Turing’s price 
increase should now be solved. Pressure of various sorts is being brought 
to bear on corporations whose conduct is deemed to be undesirable, 
whether by reason of “costs” being imposed on third parties, or on other 
bad effects, based on whatever baseline is being used. Insofar as one 
company’s outrage-inspiring behavior is another’s profit and reputation-
enhancing business opportunity, markets can be an important part of the 
solution. But society may lose interest in the broader problem—and 
nothing will change, at least until the next visceral example. 
What is the right answer here? Consensus is arguably the best guide 
for what society should encourage firms to do, but it is, of course, notori-
ously imperfect. There are certainly “causes du jour” that detract from far 
worthier causes, for instance. And there are genuinely hard issues that 
reflect deep fissures in societal values. Indeed, profit maximization’s ap-
peal in significant part reflects that what it means to be profitable is 
much better understood and agreed upon than what it means to be social-
ly responsible. But society will necessarily impede pure profit maximiza-
tion, whether through its norms, law, or more likely, a combination of the 
two. We should try to reign in the pathologies that social responsibility 
allows and arguably even encourages, while also reining in the 
well-known pathologies of profit maximization, as so well displayed in 
the financial crisis. In a recent case in which he assessed considerable 
damages against Bank of America, which bought Countrywide, for 
Countrywide’s origination of bad loans that it sold to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff said: 
In short, while the HSSL process [the loan origination process, aptly 
nicknamed Hustle] lasted only nine months, it was from start to fin-
ish the vehicle for a brazen fraud by the defendants, driven by a 
hunger for profits and oblivious to the harms thereby visited, not 
just on the immediate victims but also on the financial system as a 
whole. 36 
 
 
                                                             
 35. See News Release, Imprimis Pharm., Inc., supra note 6. 
 36. United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 494, 503 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). For a discussion of Judge Rakoff’s use of the power of exhortation to encourage 
desirable behavior and discourage undesirable behavior, see generally Claire A. Hill, Judge Jed 
Rakoff and Law’s Penumbra, 1 J. FIN. REG. 159 (2015). 
 
